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Abstract 
This paper is the first to study the effect of European antidumping policy on market structure, i.e.  the 
incentives for firms to engage in a domestic or international cartel in a multi-stage setting. The analysis 
concentrates  on  how  European  antidumping  policy  influences  the  incentives  for  firms  to  collude 
domestically or internationally.  We  tackle  the  question  of whether antidumping regulation  helps  to 
establish, maintain or rather endanger full  cartels as  well as  cartels restricted to domestic firms only. 
Our  fmdings  suggest  that  antidumping  legislation  can  both  have  a  pro-competitive  or  an  anti-
competitive effect. Which case prevails depends crucially on the welfare objective function used by the 
European  government  and  also  on  the  cost  asymmetry  and  the  degree  of product  heterogeneity 
between domestic and foreign  firms.  In  addition to  market structure we  also discuss welfare effects. 
We  find  that  antidumping  measures  are  capable  of both  increasing  or decreasing total  community 
welfare depending on the type of  measures installed. 
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1. Introduction 
In  recent  years  the  analysis  of antidumping  policy  under  imperfect  competition  has  gradually 
progressed.  One  strand  of emerging  literature  deals  with  the  impact  of anti-dumping  policy  on 
production  decisions  of domestic  and  foreign  firms  (see  a.o.  Dixit  (1988),  Prusa  (1992),  Fischer 
(1992), Reitzes (1993)).  The consensus is that the mere threat of antidumping law enforcement affects 
firms'  decision-making. Typically,  in  a quantity-setting oligopoly, domestic  output is  increased and 
foreign  exports  are  decreased  in  the  face  of possible  antidumping  measures.  This  suggests  that 
antidumping policy has a pro-competitive impact on domestic firms. Total domestic welfare effects can 
be positive or negative, depending on the type of competition that prevails in the domestic market. 
Another strand of literature deals more specifically with the relationship between cartels and 
anti-dumping policy. Staiger & Wolak (1989) shows that the imposition of anti-dumping duties may 
reduce the attractiveness of collusion for foreign firms  in their own markets, restricting the possibility 
to  dump  excess  capacity  in  the  protected  market,  thereby  suggesting  a  pro-competitive  effect  of 
domestic antidumping policy in the foreign market.  At the same time, in a repeated game setting anti-
dumping duties can be used by domestic firms to credibly punish deviations by foreign firms from an 
international cartel scenario. This was  demonstrated by  Staiger &  Wolak (1992) suggesting an  anti-
competitive effect of antidumping policy. 
Although the model presented in this paper could be used to analyze the central issues of the 
first  strand  of literature,  we  will  predominantly  focus  our  attention  on  how  antidumping  policy 
influences the incentives for and the profitability of domestic and  international cartels.  In  contrast to 
most  other  papers  in  this  area  we  will  consider  the  European  practice  where  besides  duties, 
undertakings are important antidumping measures and where the focus of the antidumping law seems 
to be more on the injury than on the dumping requirement (Vandenbussche 1996). 
The main question tackled  in  this  paper  is  whether a European-like antidumping regulation 
helps to establish, maintain or rather endanger full cartels as well as cartels restricted to domestic firms 
only.  For  this  purpose  we  construct  a  partial  equilibrium  model,  restricting  antidumping  law 
enforcement to the European government.  The set up is a multi-stage one with perfect foresight for all 
players and no a priori commitment by  the government whether and which measure to  impose. The 
environment in which the firms operate is characterized by cost asymmetry and product heterogeneity 
between domestic and foreign firms, with the foreign firm typically enjoying a cost advantage over the 
local  EU  companies.  The  rationale  for  lower  foreign  prices,  which  induce  anti-dumping  filing,  is 
efficiency-based  rather  than  driven  by  predatory  motives.  The  results  of the  model  are  derived 
algebraically and simulations were used to gain greater insight.  Our findings suggest that the type of 2 
measures taken, their impact on the incentives to collude and the resulting market structure, as well as 
their welfare  effects  all  depend  on  the  objective  of the  government together  with  extent of cost-
asymmetry  and  product  differentiation.  When  the  welfare  objective  is  total  domestic  surplus, 
antidumping regulation is  anti-competitive and cartelizes the market.  In  that case we observe mainly 
duties and the domestic welfare effect is positive.  When the government excludes domestic consumer 
interests from its welfare objective, we predict a lot more undertakings which can have both an anti- or 
a pro-competitive effect but decrease total domestic welfare. 
In the next section we discuss the model in  detail.  Section 3 reports the results of measures 
imposed and change  in  market structure for  various degrees of cost-asymmetry.  The robustness of 
these results are checked in section 4 where we consider various extensions of the model.  The welfare 
effects are discussed in section 5, where the possibilities for rent-shifting are examined.  In line of the 
political economy of  protection hypotheses, the issue of  rent-seeking is touched upon in section 6.  The 
last section summarizes the main results and hints at some policy conclusions. 
2. The model 
In order to study the effect of  anti-dumping legislation on market structure and more specifically on the 
profitability of national and international collusion, a simple model is used with 3 firms,  I foreign and 
two  domestic  firms.  The  analysis  focuses  only on  the  local  market  in  which  the  anti-dumping 
legislation prevails.  The two domestic firms are perfectly symmetric, producing a homogeneous good. 
The foreign firm supplies a differentiated good that typically can be supplied at lower (or equal) costs 
as  compared to the domestic products.  The local market is fully segmented from  other international 
markets, including the home market of the foreign firm such that the foreign firm's objective can be 
restricted to its profits in  the local market.  All this results in the following demand function for the 
domestic product: 
with  a: measure of  market size 
i *  j=1,2 representing both domestic firms 
F representing the foreign firm 
(la) 
and  0< y ~1, measuring the degree of product differentiation 
(l 'a) 
with  m: constant marginal cost of the domestic firm 
Conversely for the foreign product, we have 
PF = a  - qF  - y.  (qj +q) 
p\= PF-mF 
with  mF: constant marginal cost of the foreign firm 
(lb) 
(l 'b) 
Demand for domestic and foreign product are independent for y=O. Products become closer substitutes 
as  y moves to  I. 
The cost asymmetry between the domestic firms and the foreign firm is reflected in: 
(2) 
with 0 < s ~  1 measuring the degree of cost-asymmetry. The smaller s, the larger is the disadvantage of the local finn vis-a-vis the foreign finn.  In order to 
have a viable domestic industry, y is required to be smaller than s. 
With three finns in the industry, the following three market structure outcomes can arise: (see also 
table 1) 
i) a trio  poly with all finns deciding non-cooperatively on their output decision a  la Cournot-Nash \ 
further labeled as the (l,  1,1 )-scenario.  The maximand in this case is: 
&  &  (3) 
ii)  a duopoly with the foreign finn and a domestic cartel, which includes the two domestic finns 
coordinating their output decisions, further labeled as the (2,1) -scenario, with the corresponding 
maximand 2: 
max P'lql+ P'2q2 
ql,q2 
&  (4) 
iii) a monopoly or full cartel where all 3 finns coordinate their output decision to maximize joint 
profits in the local market, further labeled as the (3) -scenario.  The monopoly maximand is: 




Any coalition offinns can be established  (cf. coalition proofuess concept as used in Malueg & Tsutsui 
(1995)) that satisfies the following conditions: 
i)  every  finn  in  the  coalition (i.e.  those that  coordinate  their quantity  choices  in  order  to 
maximize joint profits) has an incentive to join.  This realizes internal stability as described in 
d'Aspremont et al (1983) 
ii)  every  finn  outside  the  coalition  (i.e.  those  that  behave  non-cooperatively  against  the 
coalition) do not want the join (cf.  external stability in  d'Aspremont et al.  (1983)) or will be 
excluded by the coalition members if an extension of  the coalition hurts the members. 
Following this, the domestic cartel (2,1)-scenario will  be  the outcome if the domestic finns  increase 
their profits with respect to a triopoly and when either the domestic finns or the foreign finn  do  not 
want to join a full cartel.  A full cartel (3) -scenario will only prevail if both domestic finns as well as 
the foreign finn realize higher profits as compared to the alternative (2,1) or (1,\,1) -scenario.  3  Note 
that a coalition of one domestic finn and one foreign finn is never an equilibrium choice given that it is 
always dominated by at least one of  the other market structure outcomes. 
1  With product differentiation the results can always be translated into a Bertrand competition with 
capacity constraints a  la Kreps & Scheinkman (1983). 
2  The duopoly scenario with the foreign finn coordinating with only one of  the domestic finns is 
ignored, cf infra. 
3  The  option  of side  payments  made  by  one  party  to  induce  the  other  party  to  the  payer's  most 
preferred outcome would typically  lead to  the  outcome where  the  highest joint profits  are  realized. 
Given problems of legal enforceability, the option of side payments  is  only marginally considered in 
further analysis (see section 4). 4 
As soon as all coordinating firms, i.e. both domestic firms  in the (2,1) -scenario and all 3 firms 
in  the  (3)-scenario,  realize  higher  profits  from  cooperation  as  compared  to  the  non-cooperative 
outcome,  it  is  assumed that cooperation between these  firms  can  be  established.  4  This  assumption 
implies a.o.  that if the foreign firm  would not be present  in  the local  market, the two domestic firms 
always have an  incentive to coordinate.  This implies that the pre-entry market structure is  an implicit 
domestic cartel.  Given that the operating profits of the foreign firm  are always taken to be positive 5, 
the decision of the foreign firm  to enter the  local market can be fixed  and is  not influentuable by the 
domestic parties 6. 
In  each of the market outcomes the domestic firms have the option to  file an anti-dumping 
complaint.  Following the current EU  anti-dumping legislation (see EC  regulation 2423/88) 7,  firms 
can file under the following conditions: 
i) the price charged by the foreign firm  in the local (EU) market is  lower than the firm's price 
in its home market.  This condition refers to the "dumping margin". 
Without explicitly modeling the foreign market,  it is assumed that this always holds, 
if  only because the foreign firm faces less competition at home. 
ii)  the  domestic firms  filing  an  antidumping  complaint should hold  more than half of the 
domestic production. 
This  condition  is  always  met  in  the  model  with  the foreign firm  not necessarily 
producing in the local market and the perfectly symmetric domestic firms,  having an 
identical incentive to file.  Free-riding with respect to filing can hence be dismissed. 
iii) The foreign firm's price in the local market should be lower than the domestic price.  This 
price undercutting determines the "injury margin" (Vandenbussche (1996)) s 
Note  that this  undercutting is  more  likely to  hold with  a cost-disadvantage of the 
local firms. 
The EU  anti-dumping  legislation does  not in  any  instance  discriminate  between "injury" following 
from normal competition and "injury" from predatory behavior on the part of the foreign company to 
4  Despite the benefits from cooperation, this cooperative outcome is not a Nash equilibrium in a one-
shot quantity/price game, given the incentives to cheat, cf. the Prisonner's Dilemma.  However, it is 
well known that such a cooperation can be established in an (in)finitely repeated version of  the quantity 
game, if players are sufficiently patient, while using grim trigger strategies, (Green & Porter (1984)) or 
stick &  carrot strategies (Abreu et al (1986)).  Also Staiger &  Wolak (1992) use an infinitely repeated 
scenario. 
5  If foreign operating profits would be negative, this would also imply negative profits for the 
domestic firms given the cost-asymmetry. 
6  One could include a fixed sunk cost of entering only born by the foreign firm, in which case the 
decision to enter can be studied explicitly as being based on operating profits and this fixed fee, which 
could then become negative. 
7  EU regulation 2423/88 is the latest implementation of  the WTO (ex-GAIT) anti-dumping in  EU 
legislation. 
S  The EU legislation stipulates that only when dumping causes injury, protectionist measures can be 
taken.  Vandenbussche (1996) shows that price-undercutting is the determinant factor for the injury 
calculation. 5 
drive  out  domestic  firms.  Given  no  incentives  for  predation  in  our  full-information  one  shot-
production game, the "injury" is only caused by normal competition. 
In case the domestic firm(s) decide to file, there are legal expenses for all  firms,  including the 
foreign  firm,  presented by  E >0.  The domestic firm  will decide to file  if the  net benefits after filing 
outweigh the costs E. 
Once the case arrives at the Council of Ministers, a Duty or an  Undertaking can be decided 
upon 9.  By EU  law, an Undertaking is  a voluntary price increase by the foreign firm to align on the 
domestic  price,  i.e.  firms  will  be  optimizing given  the  restriction  that  PF  =  Pi  which  in  our  model 
implies qF=ql+q2'  An undertaking results in equal post-file prices.  In this context, an  Undertaking is 
interpreted  as  an  agreement  by  the  foreign  firm  not  to  price  undercut  the  domestic  firms.  This 
agreement is assumed to be binding given that the commission closely monitors the undertaking and in 
case of violation, can impose a penalty.  A Duty, t, serves to eliminate the injury margin, increasing the 
cost of the foreign firm, mF+t.  A complete elimination of the injury margin would require setting the 
duty equal to post-file price differences  between Pi  and PI' , in  which case the same price/quantity 
levels  would  prevail  as  in  the  undertaking  case.  Implementation  of such  a  duty  level  requires 
government to  have  information  on cost levels,  in  practice  a non-trivial condition.  Indeed,  careful 
analysis of case implementations shows (Vandenbussche (1996)) that duty  levels  imposed equal  the 
pre-file injury margin.  Hence the duty, t, will be set equal to the pre-file difference between Pi  and  PF' 
To the extent that the foreign firm will absorb part of the tariff, a duty will typically not lead to equal 
post-file prices.  Given that the model wants to follow the EU practice as close as possible, the focus of 
the analysis reported here is  on pre-file price differences as  duty level.  Post-file price differences are 
discussed as alternative in section 3.4. 
In deciding on if and which measure to impose, the government is assumed to maximize local 
welfare  represented  by  G.  The  EU  anti-dumping  regulation  obliges  policy  to  meet "community 
interests", which  is  composed of three elements, local consumer surplus domestic firms'  profits and 
any possible tariff revenue 
G = zc.CS+  ~.{2(1ti - E)}  +  Zr.t.qF 
with  Zc : the weight given to consumer surplus 
~  : the weight given to producer surplus 
Zt : the weight given to tariff revenue 
CS = {(2qi Y/2 + qF2/2 + y(ql+q2)qF} 
10 
(6) 
Different weights can be  attached to  consumer and producer interests,  as  well as  tariff revenues  by 
varying the  parameter,  z.  Three typical  cases will  be  distinguished.  First,  the  Community  Interest 
Clause is  implemented through a cost-benefit analysis, which implies that consumer interests are fully 
taken  into  account (zc  =~ =Zt  =1).  In  practice  however this  Clause  has  never been  implemented, 
9  This modelling follows EU practices.  An a priori commitment of the government towards either a 
Duty or an Undertaking is only marginally considered in further analysis. 
10  For a derivation of the expression of  consumer surplus, see Pauwels et al. (1995). 6 
indicating that a scenario where consumer surplus is  ignored, fits  better with  EU  reality.  (zc=O,  z" = Z. 
=1).  This latter scenario reflects, a.o., government's decision to be driven by lobbying activities, which 
typically  producers rather than consumers are willing to  organize and fund,  see section 6.  An  often 
heard critique on EU  anti-dumping regulation  is  precisely that the  procedures are biased in  favor of 
aggrieved producers and have taken little account of the views of consumers.  Likewise, trade policy 
such  as  anti-dumping measures is  often proclaimed to  be  used  for  industrial  policy objectives (Gual 
(1995)),  again  rendering  local  producers'  profits  more  important  in  the  government's  objective 
function.  Finally, tariff revenue can be  included in  total welfare if the government invests the duty 
revenue in a welfare maximizing way. In principle, the EU  government has to  repay the duty revenue 
collected to the foreign firm.  Hence, a third scenario with tariff revenues ignored (zc=O, z" = Z. =\). is 
considered.  However, it typically lasts up  to  10  years before the government actually pays the duty 
revenue. Hence this payback option can be easily discounted, leaving the second scenario (Zc=O,  z" = z. 
= 1) to be the most relevant to describe current EU practice. 
Table  1 summarizes  the  model  structure  and  reports  for  each  distinguished  scenario  domestic  and 
foreign production and profit levels.  The EU's government objective can be calculated following (6), 
on the basis of the expressions for 1t; and t, together with q; and qF . The equilibrium outcome in terms 
of whether and which anti-dumping measure will be imposed and which market structure will prevail is 
determined  through  a  subgame  perfect  Nash  equilibrium  which  is  obtained  through  backward 
induction.  To  characterize the Nash-equilibrium outcome, first the government's choice between no 
measure,  a duty or an undertaking has to be determined, on the basis of which the post-file quantity 
choices will be made.  The outcome where the government would impose no measure is not reported in 
the  table,  since  it coincides with the  no-file outcome with  firm  profits  simply diminished by  E  and 
government's objective diminished with z".2E.  For a given market structure, the domestic firms  will 
always prefer an undertaking decision over a duty, although the difference between the two outcomes 
becomes  smaller  with  smaller  asymmetries.  Consumer  surplus  will  typically  be  lower  with  an 
undertaking decision as  compared to a duty,  except  in  a full  cartel market structure,  in  which case 
consumer surplus turns out to  be higher with  undertakings than with duties.  Again, this  difference 
decreases when asymmetries are reduced.  The foreign firm likewise prefers an undertaking over a duty 
in most instances. I I  Whereas local producers always benefit from the intervention, local consumers are 
always on the losers' side  .. 
II  Except in a domestic cartel, where a duty results in higher foreign profits than an undertaking 
decision, at least if the asymmetry is not too small, i.e. s<s* where s*  decreases for lower values for y. Appendix 1 : Model structure and firm production and payoffs 
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Restrictions on parameter values include besides s>y, Y?'d  for positive output and profits and (l-y2)/2<s(s-2y)+ I to maintain a domestic production in a full cartel 
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The foreign firm also looses, typically when its cost advantage is  large and when duties are imposed.1 2 
As  already  indicated,  all  these  results  hold  for  a  given  market  structure.  What  remains  to  be 
established is the main contribution of the paper, namely profits and welfare when market structure can 
be chosen endogenously in the full model structure. 
Given the government's decision, the domestic firms' decision whether or not to file  in  case 
the conditions for filing are met, can be  determined on the basis of profit maximization.  Given the 
filing  decision,  the  choice  of market  structure  can  finally  be  assessed,  following  the  procedure 
described supra. Only if the foreign firm  would be  making negative profits in  the prevailing market 
structure, will it decide not to enter in  which case the final  outcome would be  a cartel formed by the 
two domestic firms. 
The equilibrium outcome, in  terms of market structure chosen and the type of anti-dumping 
measure imposed, is discussed in section 3.  The results are discussed as a function of the level of  cost-
asymmetry  (parameter s)  and  product  differentiation  (parameter y)  and this  for  the  various  policy 
implementation scenarios discussed supra.  Some robustness checks are discussed in  section 4, while 
the welfare implications are suspended until section 5. 
3. The Results 
The basic focus of  this paper is on the impact of  the presence of  an EU-like anti-dumping legislation on 
the local market structure, i.e. the incentives for firms to engage or not in domestic or full cartels.  For 
this purpose, the outcome with the anti-dumping legislation, as follows from table 1,  is compared to the 
outcome in case of no anti-dumping legislation, which amounts to comparing firm profits and welfare 
in the various no-file outcomes, as reported in the same table 1.  While the foreign firm always prefers 
a full cartel in the no-file situation, the domestic firms can prefer a full  cartel versus a domestic cartel 
or a non-cooperative outcome depending on the asymmetries and product heterogeneity, indicating that 
each of these three market outcomes can prevail in the no-file situation. 
The  results  are  based on numerical  simulations  with  modest  filing  costs,  I.e.  E=O.l  which 
amounts to  1%  of the pre-entry domestic profits.  For sensitivity of the results with  respect to filing 
costs, see section 4.  The discussion of the  results  is  illustrated with graphs  in  the  (s,  y)-space. The 
parameter s,  plotted on the  Y-axis,  represents  different values of cost asymmetry where  s= 1 is  the 
symmetric  case.  The  parameter  y,  plotted  on  the  X-axis  represents  different  values  of product 
heterogeneity  where y = 1  is  the  identical  product  case.  In  order  to  maintain  a  viable  domestic 
industry, the restriction is imposed that products need to be increasingly more differentiated when cost-
asymmetries become larger: y <So  The EU antidumping legislation requires that the foreign product is 
a 'like product' or a similar product compared to the locally produced product. Therefore we limit our 
attention  to  parameter constellations  s > y > 0.55.  Figures  1 through  3 show  equilibrium  market 
12  Foreign firms may however gain from undertakings, but only when the cost asymmetry is small (in 
the infra reported numerical example when s=0.95 for a domestic cartel and s=0.8 for a triopoly). 9 
structure  outcomes  without and  with  anti-dumping  regulation,  as  represented  through  the  variously 
hatched areas.  In  addition, these figures represent through the thickly outlined areas the anti-dumping 
measure prevailing in  the equilibrium market structure.  What is  not represented in  the graphs are the 
anti-dumping measures that prevail in other, out-of-equilibrium market structures.  These choices will 
show up in the description of the results to explain the arising of the various equilibria. 
3.1. Symmetry 
The outcome in  case of symmetry between domestic and  foreign  firms,  s=l, is  worth reporting as  a 
first benchmark for further asymmetric scenarios.  Without anti-dumping legislation, domestic firms as 
well  as  the  foreign  firm  always  prefer  to  join  a  full  cartel,  thus  monopolizing  the  market.  The 
government of  course  favors  a  non-cooperative  triopoly  outcome,  at  least if consumer  interests  are 
taken into account.  With the  anti-dumping legislation, filing  is  not possible when s=l, given equal 
post-entry prices and the outcome remains a full cartel with or without anti-dumping legislation.  This 
result holds  irrespective  of filing  costs  and government decisions  in  terms of whether and  how  to 
intervene with duties versus undertakings. 
The  analysis  becomes  more  interesting  when  asymmetries  between  domestic  and  foreign 
producers  are  taken  into  account.  The  ideal  case  where  the  Community  Interest  Clause  is  being 
implemented by the EU government is discussed first in section 3.2.  Section 3.3 describes the results 
in  the more relevant case when this Clause is  left unimplemented.  Section 3.4 discusses the results 
when tariff revenues are  disregarded.  In  the presentation of the  results  we  will  make  a distinction 
between the market structure ruling before and after antidumping implementation. The results will be 
separated by a slash, with the pre-antidumping outcome before and the post-antidumping outcome after 
the slash. 
3.2. Cost asymmetries: the case of  a Community Interest Clause  (G= CS+ {2(ni - E)}+ t.qF) 
(i)  A full cartel as pre- or no anti-dumping outcome 
The easiest scenario to start with is the full cartel scenario (area D).  If cost-asymmetries are small and 
furthermore products are sufficiently differentiated, not only the  foreign  firm,  but also  the domestic 
firms have an interest in joining a full cartel, in the absence of anti-dumping procedures. When an EU-
like  anti-dumping  procedures  prevails,  domestic  firms  will  file.  The  government  prefers  an 
undertaking over a  duty  in  case  of  full  cartelisation,  despite  the  forbearance  of duty  revenues  but 
because domestic profits together with consumer surplus are higher.  13  All this  implies no change in 
market outcome in the existence of an EU-like anti-dumping legislation, i.e. a full cartel is maintained, 
while domestic firm's profits and welfare improves through the undertaking. 
13  Note that if  the market structure would have been a domestic cartel, the government would in this 






0.6  0.65  0.7  0.75  0.8  0.85  0.9  0.95 
B=(2+1I 3)  1+1+113)  D=(3/3)  E=(1+1+1I2+1) 
Figure 1: Change in Market Structure and Antidumping Measures 
Consumer surplus included in the Government's objective function =c =  1 and =,= 1 
(ii)  A domestic cartel as pre- or no- anti-dumping outcome 
A domestic (2+1)-cartel scenario arises in case of large asymmetries (area A), but can also occur with 
smaller asymmetries as long as products are sufficiently, but not excessively differentiated (area B). 
While the foreign firms  always prefers a full  cartel, such a full  cartel  is  not desired by the domestic 
firms  given  that they are  at  too  much a  cost-disadvantage relative to the foreign  firm  (area A)  or 
because products are not enough differentiated (area B).  Consequently, the domestic firms would be 
carrying the  largest share of the cost of colluding  which  comes  from  restricting  output  in  order to 
increase price.  In  the absence of side payments from  the foreign to the domestic firms, only a cartel 
restricted to the domestic firms will be the market structure outcome. 
If antidumping legislation prevails, it matters crucially which measures the government will 
take. 14  In  case of large asymmetries (area A), the government will always impose a duty if domestic 
14  The government will always impose a measure, duty or undertaking, after filing, at least when tariff 
revenues are included, cf infra.  No measure would result in lower welfare, within a given market 
structure. II 
firms file, whatever the market structure that would arise.  This typically implies that a domestic cartel 
is maintained as market structure and the presence of anti-dumping legislation has no  impact on market 
structure.  The  duty  nevertheless  increases  domestic  profits  and  total  welfare  despite  a  drop  in 
consumer surplus.  If the foreign product is  sufficiently differentiated, y $s-0.2,  it  would pay for  the 
domestic  firms  to  move  to  a  full  cartel,  because  the  tariff has  smoothened  enough  the  prevailing 
disadvantages.  However,  in  this  case,  the  foreign  firm,  given  the  imposition  of a  duty,  prefers  to 
behave non-cooperatively against the domestic cartel rather than joining a full cartel, leaving again the 
no-file market structure unaffected by the dumping regulation. 
When the asymmetries are small, the government would still impose a duty in case the market 
structure is a domestic cartel15•  As long as also a duty is imposed in a full cartel, we have an  identical 
market structure with or without anti-dumping regulation (area A).  But if the government prefers an 
undertaking in  a full cartel, which occurs if products are not too differentiated and asymmetry is  low 
enough, then the domestic firms prefer a full cartel over a domestic cartel only.  In the absence of side 
payments,  a  switch  in  market structure will  however only  occur  if the  foreign  firm  is  willing  to 
cooperate with the domestic cartel, given the presence of  an undertaking decision.  This will only occur 
if the cost advantage of the foreign firm  is  not too  large (area B).  Hence, in  this  area of parameter 
configurations, the presence of an EU-like anti-dumping regulation increases the scope for collusion: 
from a domestic cartel only to a full international cartel, a case where anti-dumping regulation clashes 
with anti-trust. 
(iii) A triopoly as pre- or no- anti-dumping outcome 
The case of a trio  poly as the pre-anti-dumping -scenario arises if products are  not too differentiated 
(i.e. y is never lower than 0.8, while always being smaller than s).  That is to say that foreign entry will 
cause the domestic cartel to break down.(areas C and E). 
Note  that  when  asymmetries  are  too  small  (s>0.8),  there  will  be  no  injury  or  price 
undercutting  if the  market structure would be  a non-cooperative triopoly.  Hence,  in  this  case  the 
domestic firms  have no filing  option in  a triopoly,  but they can  file  in  case of cartelisation.  With 
consumer interests taken into  account,  the government would  impose a  duty  in  case of a  domestic 
cartel (area E) but would prefer an undertaking in  case of a full cartel (area C).  With firms correctly 
anticipating these government choices, they will prefer a full cartel setting, given the higher protection 
offered through the undertaking (area C).  Hence anti-dumping legislation turns a triopoly into a full 
cartel with undertaking.  We have here again a clear instance where anti-dumping clashes with anti-
trust.  If the asymmetry is large, i.c. 0.8 < s < 0.9, "only" a domestic cartel will be established (area E), 
despite the preference of the domestic firms for a full cartel, but because the foreign firm  prefers to 
15  A filing cost E=O.l  prevents filing in a domestic cartel where duties are imposed if s>0.9 and y~0.7. 
But even when filing costs would be low enough to allow for a file, the reported results are not 
affected.  Note that in a triopoly, there will never be a file, either because of  no undercutting with s>0.8 
or with s=0.8 because the filing cost E=O.loutweighs the benefits from filing, given that only a duty is 





behave non-cooperatively.  In any case, the foreign firm  will gain from  the existence of anti-dumping 
regulation, and this because of  the induced change from a triopoly to a cartel. 
In  summary,  when community  interest  clauses  are  implemented,  an  EU-like  anti-dumping 
regulation induces anti-competitive changes  in  market structure, at  least when  products are  not  very 
differentiated and/or asymmetries are relatively modest.  In  these cases moves from  a triopoly to  a full 
cartel (area C) or from a domestic cartel towards a full cartel (area B) will be observed. 
3.3. Cost asymmetries: the community interest clause unimplemented  (G= {2(n; - !;)}+ t.qF) 
DUTIES 
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Figure 2: Change in Market Structure and Antidumping Measures 
Consumer surplus excluded in Government 'objective Zc =0 and z,= 1 
(i) A full cartel as pre- or no anti-dumping outcome 
When consumer interests were taken into account, the presence of an EU-Iike anti-dumping legislation 
did not cause a change in market structure, when government imposed an undertaking in a full cartel, 
or a duty was be imposed in a domestic cartel.  When ignoring consumer interests, the opposite holds: 
government would decide on duties in the full cartel but will prefer an undertaking in a domestic cartel. 
Given that the  domestic firms  can  perfectly  foresee  these  government  choices,  they  will  prefer to 
collude  only  internally,  in  which  case  an  undertaking  will  arise,  rather than join a  full  cartel  with 13 
duties.  Hence, we have a situation where the anti-dumping legislation reduces the scope for collusion, 
from a full international cartel to a domestic cartel onlyl6. 
(ii) A domestic cartel as pre- or no- anti-dumping outcome 
When a domestic cartel would prevail without anti-dumping, which is the case when asymmetries are 
large  or  products  are  sufficiently  differentiated  (areas  H,  G  and  F),  different  outcomes  prevail 
depending on government's decisions. 
If the  cost-asymmetry  is  large,  i.c.  s  <  0.7,  a  duty  is  imposed  independent of the  market 
structure and the domestic cartel  is  maintained (area H).  Hence,  anti-dumping causes no effect on 
market structure and welfare  improves  from  the duty.  However if the asymmetry  is  not too  large: 
0.7<s,  y<0.8,  the government will  impose  an  undertaking  in  a domestic  cartel (2, I)-scenario.  In  a 
triopolistic market structure the government would be  even more  inclined towards undertakings:  i.e. 
already with 0.7:S:s<0.8.  Given these  government decisions, firms  will always file  if conditions are 
met, but will the market structure be affected by the existence of  an EU-like anti-dumping legislation? 
When the government would decide on  an  undertaking in  the (2,1)-scenario17,  the domestic cartel  is 
maintained and anti-dumping again does  not affect the market structure, see area F. Note that if the 
asymmetry is very small, s=0.95, the foreign firm will also gain from an undertaking. 
However  there  exist  parameter  configurations  in  which  imposition  of an  EU-like  anti-
dumping legislation could destroy a domestic cartel, turning a (2,1) -scenario into a triopoly outcome, 
namely those configurations where the government would only decide on an  undertaking in  case of 
triopoly while favoring a duty in case of cartelisation, which arises with larger asymmetries and high 
enough  product  differentiation  (area G).  In  such  a  situation  the  domestic  firm  will  abstain  from 
colluding and enjoying "only" duties.  Instead, they will prefer a non-cooperative setting, in which case 
a more favorable undertaking, decided by the government, will more than compensate for the foregone 
collusive profits.  This is at least if filing is possible in a triopoly (Le.  s<0.85).  Hence the presence of 
an  anti-dumping  regulation  would  break  a  domestic  cartel  and  establish  a  triopoly,  be  it  with  an 
undertaking, increasing total welfare  18  We have again a case where anti-dumping legislation serves as 
an instrument of  anti-trust policy!  19 
16  If the government would commit to a duty upfront, the full cartel can be maintained.  A 
commitment to an undertaking decision, would install a (2,1) scenario.  Because of  the tariff revenues 
the government would prefer to commit to a duty rather than an undertaking, when it ignores consumer 
interests. 
17 Note that in a triopoly a similar undertaking decision would prevail, while in a full cartel, the 
government decides typically on a duty.  But even if an undertaking would also be decided on in a full 
cartel, which occurs with the level of  differentiation and the asymmetry not too high, the domestic firm 
would still prefer a partial collusion with only domestic firms. 
18  Domestic firms gain despite the abandance of  collusion, but through the imposition of an 
undertaking.  The consumers loose from the undertaking, but the loss is tempered through the move to 
non-cooperative domestic firm  behavior. 
19  If the government would precommit to an undertaking, there would be no change in market 
structure: a (2, I) scenario is maintained.  If the government would precommit to a duty, the market 
structure that would arise is a full cartel, preferred by the domestic as well as the foreign producers. 14 
(iii) A triopo/y as pre- or no- anti-dumping outcome 
A triopoly as  pre-anti-dumping scenario arises if products are not too differentiated (area J).  In  the 
presence of an  anti-dumping regulation, where there is  no filing  possibility in  triopoly, the domestic 
firms  will  be  willing  to  collude  domestically,  only  because  of the  protection  offered  by  the 
antidumping regulation.  Indeed, when consumer interests are  ignored, the  government would always 
decide on an undertaking in case of filing,  independent of the market structure prevailing.  Through the 
undertaking,  the domestic  firms  will  be  colluding.  The  scope  of this  collusion  is  restricted  to  the 
domestic firms only.  A full cartel is not attractive for the domestic firms, with an  advantaged foreign 
player, given the too homogeneous products.  Hence, the EU-like anti-dumping legislation would result 
in  a domestic cartel that would else have broken down because of the foreign  entry,  again a case of 
collision between anti-dumping and anti-trust.  Contrary to the case where consumer interests would be 
taken into account, there is never a move to a full cartel, since the government is willing to impose an 
undertaking already in  a domestic cartel when it only considers local producer interests, while only a 
duty would be imposed when consumer interests are taken into account. 
3.4. Cost asymmetries: Domestic Producers Interest only  (G =  {2(1tj - E)}) 
Given that tariff revenues may not always be permanently acquired, i.e. when they have to be returned, 
cf. supra, or because they are considered to be windfall benefits to the government,  it is worthwhile to 
consider the  sensitivity of the  results to  the  inclusion or not of tariff revenues  in  the government's 
objective function. 
When  tariff revenues  are  ignored,  i.e.  only  domestic  firm  profits  are  taken  into  account, 
domestic firms will always file if conditions are met, given that the government will always impose an 
undertaking throughout.  All this  implies that the pro-competitive effect of anti-dumping regulation 
derived  supra  (area  G  in  figure  2),  vanishes  when  tariff revenues  are  ignored.  Indeed  the  pro-
competitive effect arose because the government decided on an undertaking in triopoly but, induced by 
the revenue generation, would  impose a duty in  a duopoly,  pushing the  domestic firm  away from  a 
domestic collusion towards non-cooperative behavior.  In this area of parameter configurations, in the 
absence of tariff revenues, the domestic cartel that would prevail without anti-dumping regulation  is 
maintained in case of anti-dumping regulation, be it with undertaking.  The pro-competitive effect of 
anti-dumping regulation  in  case of high differentiation and  low asymmetry, where a full  cartel with 
duties would be abandoned for a domestic cartel with undertaking (area K in  figure 2),  is  maintained 
even if undertakings would also prevail in a full cartel (area N in figure 3).  This indicates that this pro-
competitive effect prevails as soon as their is protection, not necessarily because of higher protection in 
less cooperative settings. 
Hence, from an anti-trust point of view, government's commitment to a anti-dumping intervention is 
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Note that the results described here, i.e. anti-competitive effects of antidumping in case of low 
differentiation and pro-competitive effects in case of low  asymmetry and high differentiation, depend 
on  the  peculiarity that the  government will  always  impose  an  undertaking,  in the absence of tariff 
revenues.  Consequently, the results reported in figure 3 can  also be interpreted as the outcome in case 
of government's commitment to an  undertaking decision.  Also the case where duty levels would be 
imposed that result in post-file rather than pre-file equal prices,  in  which case duties or undertakings 
have an identical impact on finn profits, gives the same results in tenns of market structure changes. 
4. Robustness of the Results 
4.1. Side payments and cooperative solutions 
As indicated supra, if side payments between producers were allowed and are legally enforceable, the 
market outcome that would  prevail  with  and  without anti-dumping,  is  the outcome that yields  the 
highest total  industry profits, which is  a full  cartel setting.  Irrespective of asymmetries and product 
differentiation, the foreign finn always realizes enough extra benefits from a full cartel to compensate 
the  domestic  finns.  Hence,  whatever the  outcome of the  anti-dumping  procedure, the  final  market 
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outcome will always be a full  cartel, without the domestic firms  filing.  While anti-dumping does not 
affect the market outcome in  this case,  it will affect the size of the  money transfer required from  the 
foreign firm  to compensate the domestic firms.  The domestic firms  gain from  anti-dumping measures 
and hence will  have to  be  compensated more to  move to  a full  cartel.  With a number of noticeable 
exemptions, cf. supra, the foreign firm typically looses and hence is willing to pay more to move to its 
preferred outcome. 
Similarly,  if firms  are  allowed to  explicitly  cooperate,  anything  that  Pareto  dominates  the 
alternative scenario can be established 20.  With joint (domestic and foreign) profits always highest in a 
full cartel, the latter will be the final market outcome in  all  cases.  While the presence of antidumping 
does not affect the market outcome in this case, it does affect what parties can secure in the bargaining 
process, by affecting the threat point positions. 
4.2. Pre-file settlements. 
In  most of the  observed outcomes,  domestic  firms  will  file  and  governments will  impose  an  anti-
dumping measure, be it a duty or an undertaking.  With the model assumption of  complete information, 
the  foreign  firm  can  and will correctly anticipate the  government's decision.  Why  then  would the 
foreign  firm  not  immediately  select  the  price/quantity  combination  that  would  prevail  after  the 
government  intervention,  hence  avoiding  filing  costs?  Note  that  in  such  a  case,  we  would  never 
observe any anti-dumping intervention, which contradicts empirical observations. 
Typically,  this  problem  is  tackled  in  the  literature  by  assuming  uncertainty  about  the 
government decision (e.g. Reitzes (1993)), for instance because of uncertainty about the importance of 
the various components in the welfare function.  As the previous section and comparing figure  1 and 
figure 2 abundantly details, government decisions can indeed depend critically on Zc.  With high levels 
of differentiation, duties will always prevail, the lower left areas in both figure  1 and 2, whereas with 
high levels of  y , i.e.  highly homogeneous goods, and low levels of asymmetry, the upper right area in 
both  figures,  undertakings will always arise .. But in-between  levels  of differentiation will results  in 
undertakings  with  consumer  interests  ignored,  while  duties  are  more  likely  to  prevail  if consumer 
interests are taken into account. 
A  second set of circumstances under which  foreign  firms  might abstain  from  immediately 
selecting the  post-anti-dumping outcome is  the structure of the  filing  costs.  No or negligible filing 
costs  for  the  foreign  firm  or uncertainty  about the  filing  costs of the  domestic  firms  that could  be 
expected  to  be  substantial,  again  result  in  the  foreign  firm  not  choosing  the  post-intervention 
quantity/price upfront, at least if it would be harmed by the intervention. 
A third reason why foreign firms would not immediately quote the ex post price/quantity and 
avoid filing,  is  because it typically takes time before the filing  procedure is  finished and the duty or 
w  .  A cooperative Nash bargainmg solution for instance, would give each party at least his best 
alternative plus a fraction of the extra benefits from cooperation, where this fraction depends on the 
parties' bargaining power. 17 
undertaking is  imposed.  An analysis of EU  cases learns that the  investigation period on average lasts 
12  months  (Messerlin (1989».  During that period usually  no  measures  are  imposed  21.  Suppose  it 
takes  I period before the investigation procedure  is  finished.  The model would have  to  be  adjusted 
such that the payoffs cover 2 periods: nnomcas + 5 (naftC""cas -E) for every player.  In such a 2-period model, 
the decision of the government as  well as  the domestic firm  to  file or not remains as  analyzed supra. 
The foreign firm however needs to evaluate whether to "do nothing", which yields  nF nomcas  - E +  5nF 
aft,""cas  versus already quoting in the first period the price/quantity that corresponds to the outcome after, 
if any, filing, which yields (1 +5)nF .ft,"",as 
As long as nF nomeas  - E >nF afte""eas  foreign firms have no  interest in anticipating the government 
action.  This  condition  can  easily be  checked and  will  typically  hold  when  anti-dumping hurts  the 
foreign  firm.  However situations can be pinpointed where  the  foreign  firm,  within  a given  market 
structure, benefits from the anti-dumping regulation typically in a domestic cartel when an undertaking 
would be decided and when the asymmetries are very small (i.c. s=0.95).  In this case, irrespective ofy 
and irrespective of  the filing costs, no filing procedure would be observed in a domestic cartel.  All this 
implies that in the upper area of area F in figure 2, with a domestic cartel prevailing without and with 
anti-dumping intervention, the results remain  as  in  the one-period model,  namely a domestic cartel, 
where this domestic cartel will operate with an equal price constraint.  But, contrary to the one-period 
model, both the domestic and the foreign firm will avoid the filing costs. 
4.3. Filing costs 
Filing costs  represent all  expenditures associated with  filing,  such as  legal  expenses, administration 
costs, but also the  opportunity costs of managerial or other personnel time spent on  the case.  As 
already indicated, the level of filing costs considered in the previous section is relatively modest: only 
1  % of pre-entry profits.  Lower levels of E do not change the reported results  22.  Of  course, if filing 
costs  would  be  prohibitively high  to  outweigh the  domestic  firm's  benefits  from  filing,  the  no-file 
option will prevail.  This critical level of the filing cost depends on the extra benefits of the domestic 
firm  from  the filing option and hence will be specific for a duty or an undertaking decision and vary 
across market structures. The smaller the cost-asymmetry, the  lower the critical filing  costs will  be. 
This implies that, all else equal, the larger the asymmetries, the more costs firms are willing to incur to 
get "protection". Typically, the domestic firm  realizes higher profits from an undertaking as compared 
to a duty,  and hence is willing to incur higher filing costs when an undertaking can be foreseen.  The 
market  structure  in  which  the  firms  are  embedded  likewise  influences  the  critical  filing  costs. 
Typically, the critical filing costs will  be highest in  a full  cartel,  in-between in a domestic cartel and 
lowest in a triopoly. Therefore domestic firms are willing to pay most for anti-dumping measures when 
21  Temporary measures can be imposed if asked for by the complaining European firms. 
22  The level of E=O.1  is so low that it seldomly prohibits the domestic firms from filing.  And even if it 
prohibits filing, the outcome that would arise if filing would be possible with lower E would never 
interfere with the final outcome, as reported supra. 18 
they  are  in  a full  cartel  scenario.  This  result  holds  independent of the  level  of differentiation  and 
asymmetry.  However,  the  difference  between  these  critical  costs  reduces  when  firms  become  less 
asymmetric.23 
Given that the critical filing costs are specific for each market outcome, one could envisage 
settings  in  which  filing  costs are substantial enough to  prevent firms  from  filing  in  some outcomes, 
while still allowing for a filing decision in others. This in  tum is  likely to have an  impact on the final 
equilibrium outcome. Of course, if filing costs are too high to prevent filing  in  any market structure, 
the antidumping procedure is never activated and hence does not affect the market structure.  Most of 
the supra observed anti-competitive effects of  antidumping remain or are reinforced with filing costs 
higher than 0.1.  24  However, the pro-competitive effects of antidumping are  not robust for higher 
levels of filing costs.  For instance, if filing costs are high enough to prevent filing in  area G in  figure 
2,  but not high  enough to  prevent filing  in  case of a  full  cartel with  duties,25  the  final  equilibrium 
outcome would be a domestic cartel with no file.  Although the domestic firm would prefer a full cartel 
with a duty imposed,  the foreign firm will not align on the cartel.  Hence, in this case the anti-dumping 
regulation  has  no  impact from  an  anti-trust point of view.  Similarly,  in  area  K  in  figure  2,  the 
beneficial move from  a full  cartel towards a domestic cartel because of the anti-dumping procedure, 
would  vanish  with  higher  filing  costs.  If filing  costs  are  higher than  the  critical  filing  costs  in  a 
domestic cartel, it would prevent filing in a (2,1 )-scenario with undertaking, resulting in a full cartel as 
the [mal equilibrium, unaffected by the existence of  an anti-dumping regulation. 
5. Welfare effects and rent shifting 
The  model  can  also  be  used  to  tackle  the  question  of whether  anti-dumping  protection  increases 
European welfare vis-it-vis welfare in the absence of protection: a critical question from a trade policy 
point  of view.  The  ability  of governments  to  increase  welfare  through  unilateral  protection  in 
imperfectly competitive industries was first developed by Brander & Spencer (1985) and Eaton and 
Grossman (1986).  In the literature, this is known as the strategic trade policy argument for protection. 
When governments can credibly precommit to a specific trade policy, government intervention secures 
a  larger market share  for the  domestic  producers  and shifts rent from  the  foreign  producers to  the 
domestic economy.  In  this  paper,  the  government does  not precommit to  the  use  of anti-dumping 
23  As a consequence of  this, for s high enough,  s=0.9, 0.95, the critical filing costs are higher in a 
domestic cartel as compared to a full cartel, at least for high levels of differentiation (y<=0.7). 
24  For example, the anti-competitive effect observed in area J in figure 2 is reinforced if  filing costs 
could be high enough to prevent filing in a triopoly and a domestic cartel, while still low enough to 
allow for filing in a full cartel (e.g. for y=0.95;  E could be larger than .095 but still smaller than .498, 
where this range shrinks with lower values ofy).  In this case the final market outcome with an anti-
dumping procedure, would be a full cartel with undertaking, indicating that higher filing costs would 
cause higher detrimental effect of the anti-dumping procedure on the market structure. 
25  e.g. with y =0.7 this would amount to E being larger than .202 but still smaller than .289. Note that 
this range in which the filing costs should be situated reduces with lower values ofy, to vanish 
completely with y=0.55 19 
measures but there is perfect foresight as to what the government's objectives are and which measures 
will  be  taken  in  the  event of filing  an  anti-dumping complaint.  Hence  the  behavior of foreign  and 
domestic producers will be affected by the presence of such a regulation.  The government's objective 
from its narrowest to its broadest interpretation can respectively vary from  local producer surplus only, 
to  the sum of local producer surplus as  well as  consumer surplus  26  and including any possible tariff 
revenues.  From  a  normative perspective,  it  can be  argued that the  latter objective  is  what the  EU 
government should maximize.  In  what follows  the  results  under the  various  different government 
objectives are contrasted with what ought to be government's concern.  Before moving to the results, it 
is  important to  note  that welfare  effects  arise  not  only  because  of the  imposition of a  duty  or  an 
undertaking within a given market structure, but also because of possible changes in firm's incentives 
to collude  induced by the existence of an  anti-dumping regulation.  Furthermore, the  imposition of 
anti-dumping measures does not always coincide with rent-shifting.  Cases will be pinpointed where an 
increase in domestic surplus because of the anti-dumping regulation is  not always to the detriment of 
foreign firms. 
5.1. Community Interest Clause Implemented  (G= CS+2(TCj -E)+tqF) 
When the product asymmetry and the cost advantage for the foreign firm are substantial, y<s<O.8,  it  is 
optimal for the government to install an anti-dumping duty.  Figure 4 clearly shows that whenever a 
duty is  imposed, total community welfare increases.  In these cases, the duty revenue and increases in 
local producer surplus are high enough to offset the reduction in  consumer surplus as a result of anti-
dumping  protection.  Under  duty  protection,  local  producer surplus  increases  and  foreign  surplus 
decreases.  Interesting to note is that the scope for rent-shifting increases with the cost advantage of the 
foreign firm. 
An  increase  in  welfare  with  an  undertaking  is  far  less  likely.  The  only  parameter 
constellations where this occurs is for low cost asymmetries by high product differentiation resulting in 
a full cartel market structure. For this vertically hatched area (see figure 4) the loss in consumer surplus 
is  more than compensated by the shift in  profits from  the  foreign  to  the  domestic firms  due to  the 
undertaking. 
26  Whereas in Brander & Spencer (1985) and Eaton & Grossman (1986), a domestic and a foreign firm 
compete in a third market, the model here has firms competing in the local market, explicitly taking 
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Figure 4: The change in welfare between the equilibrium market structure with anti-dumping 
regulation and the market structure in case of no-Anti-dumping regulation 
Consumer surplus and tarifJrevenues included in the government's objective  (zc=1 and Zt= 1) 
For all  other parameter constellations where undertakings are imposed,  domestic welfare  is 
reduced.  Moreover, the market is cartelized as a result of the undertakings.  In this area the gains that 
accrue to local producers are far smaller than the losses suffered by the local consumers. The overall 
reduction in welfare can be split up in two opposing forces. This can best be understood by comparing 
figure 4 with figure 1. On the one hand there is a negative welfare effect caused by the anti-competitive 
effect of an undertaking on the market structure. On the other hand, the imposition of an undertaking 
yields a positive welfare effect.  However, the cartelization of the market is the more dominant effect 
of the two, resulting in  a net negative welfare impact.  When product differentiation is  reduced,  i.e. 
higher  levels  of y,  the  negative  welfare  change caused  by  the  change  in  market structure  is  even 
reinforced as we go from  a triopoly to a full  international cartel.  In these cases, an undertaking also 
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Figure 5: The change in welfare between the equilibrium market structure with anti-dumping 
regulation and the market structure in case of no-Anti-dumping regulation 
Consumer surplus excluded and tariff  revenues included in the government's objective  (zc=O and z,= 1) 
gamma 
Again a correspondence between the welfare changes and the type of measures installed can 
be  established from  comparing  fig  5  and  fig  2.  With  a  duty,  total  welfare  increases,  whereas  an 
undertaking  always  results  in  a  welfare  decrease,  irrespective  whether the  undertaking  has  a  pro-
competitive (y<0.75)  or an  anti-competitive effect (y>0.8).  In  those  instances where an undertaking 
enhances competition, the welfare gain from increased competition is offset by the undertaking.  When 
an undertaking reduces competition, this leads to a negative welfare change that reinforces the negative 
welfare  effect  of protection.  Hence,  pro-competitive  effects  of antidumping  are  only  welfare 
improving if  they involve duties rather than undertakings. 
When only local producer surplus is  taken into account and tariff revenues are  ignored, the 
results  are very homogeneous for  all  parameter constellations and hence not shown here.  Although 
domestic producers are  always better off with than without the  undertaking, total welfare  is  always 
lower under anti-dumping protection.  This result holds both in the case where anti-dumping measures 
have a pro- as opposed to an anti-competitive effect. 22 
6. Contingent protection  and rent-seeking 
Previously we touched upon the reason why a government may want to  limit its objective to  producer 
surplus only.  According to the political economy of protection literature, the political market is similar 
to  other markets to the extent that politicians maximize their own utility rather than  general welfare. 
The level of protection is than the outcome of supply and demand forces.  Typically, the demand side 
consisting of domestic producers  is  well organized and  is  willing to  devote resources trying to get a 
decision  in  its  favor.  This  is  called rent-seeking.  Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) and Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck (1994) are  two  econometric studies that  confirm  the  political  economy explanation  for 
antidumping protection in the US and the EU respectively. 
The  simulation results  in  our paper suggest that domestic firms'  profits are  always  highest 
with  an  undertaking in  the (2,I)-market structure.  However,  when the  government cares  about total 
community welfare, this solution is  never arrived at.  When products are very heterogeneous and cost 
asymmetries large (bottom left area in figure 1), it imposes duties which lead only to a limited gain for 
domestic producers. When products are more homogeneous and cost differences small (top right comer 
in  figure  1),  the  equilibrium  outcome  is  a  full  cartel  where  undertakings  will  prevail,  since  in  a 
domestic cartel only a duty will prevail. Although domestic producers' gains under undertakings in  a 
full cartel are already higher than under a duty, they could have gotten more if only the government 
had decided on an undertaking in  the (2, I)-structure.  Only if the government limits  its  objective to 
domestic producer surplus, this outcome is  reached and domestic producers get their highest payoff 
possible in the game and this for all the parameter constellations. 
Thus, domestic producers have an incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to try 
and induce the government to change its  objective from  general welfare to  domestic profits only.  A 
measure  for  the  rent-seeking  incentive  could be  a  comparison  between  domestic  profits  when  the 
government maximizes  general welfare  and their profits when the government maximizes  producer 
surplus only.  From this we conclude that the incentive to rent-seek increases when the cost asymmetry 
is higher and products differ more. 
The  possibility to  rent-seek is  not limited to the domestic firms  only but also applies to the 
foreign firm.  The foreign firm is always best off without intervention and the highest payoff is reached 
under  the  full  cartel  (3)-situation  without  antidumping  measures??  In  case  the  government  is 
determined to intervene, foreign firms can still try to reach their most preferred anti-dumping measure. 
Under the (2, I)-market structure, for small cost differences, the foreign firm shares the domestic firm's 
preference for undertakings over duties. However, for substantial cost differences the foreign  firm  is 
better off with a duty (see also footnote 10).  In those cases, domestic and foreign firms' interests clash. 
27 The no intervention outcomes can be arrived at if the government were to extend its objective to the 
sum of domestic and foreign profits rather than to domestic profits only.  In a more general equilibrium 
analysis, this extension would be more likely anyway in case the foreign firm has substantial retaliatory 
power. 23 
In  a full  cartel (3)-structure and in a triopoly (I, I, I ,)-structure, both the domestic and the foreign firm 
will always prefer an undertaking over a duty.  28 
7. Conclusions 
This paper is  the first to study  the effect of European anti-dumping policy on market structure and 
welfare.  In  the set up of the model we tried to  capture the  EU  decision-making process involved as 
closely as  possible.  In  earlier empirical studies it  has  been alleged that European antidumping cases 
often  involve  cartels,  probably  because  they  are  in  a  better  position  to  claim  injury  from  dumped 
imports. In this paper we started off with the existence of a domestic European cartel in the absence of 
foreign  entry.  Then we proceeded to analyse the incentives provided by the  antidumping legislation 
for domestic and foreign firms to engage or not in a domestic or full cartel after foreign entry. 
The results showed that when domestic and  foreign  firms  are perfectly symmetric, all  firms 
have an incentive to collude, irrespective of whether an anti-dumping legislation is in existence or not. 
The analysis becomes more interesting when asymmetries between the domestic and the foreign firms 
are  considered.  When the EU acts  in the spirit of the  Community Interest Clause, the  antidumping 
measures taken are predominantly duties. Only when cost differences are small, undertakings will be 
installed.  When  the  Community  Interest  clause  is  implemented  and  when  antidumping  measures 
change market structure, which happens with not too large cost differences and when products are not 
too  differentiated,  the  effect  is  always  an  anticompetitive  one.  In  some  instances  the  EU  market 
structure goes from a domestic to an international cartel and in other instances from a triopoly to a full 
international cartel when antidumping law  is  implemented.  In  all  those cases antidumping collides 
with antitrust policy. 
When the scope of  the government objective function is narrowed down to domestic producer 
surplus and tariff revenue only, the model predominantly predicts the use of undertakings.  Only in the 
event of substantial  cost  differences  and considerable  product heterogeneity  between domestic  and 
foreign  firms,  duties will be  imposed.  Ignoring consumer welfare results  in  anti-dumping to either 
have a pro-competitive or an anti-competitive effect. In a more limited number of cases where we have 
a pro-competitive effect, namely when cost differences are not too large and products are sufficiently 
differentiated, the model shows that antidumping law can serve as an instument for antitrust policy in 
the  EU.  Domestic  firms  are  induced  to  less  collusive  market  structures  because  of the  (higher) 
protection offered by the antidumping law. 
28 These analytical results can be used to explain EU  anti-dumping practice (Vandenbussche (1996)). 
Japanese  firms  are  typically  found  to  lobby  to  obtain  an  undertaking  decision,  a  practice  which 
confirms a model setting of not too  large  cost asymmetries.  However the  EU  typically decides on 
duties rather than undertakings when Japanese firms are involved.  When consumer interests are taken 
into  account,  the  model  indeed  indicates  this  as  the  optimal  policy  choice  when  products  are 
sufficiently differentiated (see the upper left part of area A in figure  I).  And even if consumer interests 
would be  ignored, the model predicts a duty decision if products are sufficiently differentiated (lower 
left  part  of area  F  in  figure  2).  For  Eastern  European  companies,  however,  where  product 
differentiation is typically less obvious, undertakings are observed more frequently. 24 
If we  narrow government objective function even further to  domestic producer surplus only, 
undertakings are the only type of measures observed for all cases.  The market structure is  usually not 
affected by the antidumping implementation.  However when cost disadvantages are only modest,  the 
protection offered by the undertaking to the domestic producers will induce market structure changes. 
Pro-competitive effects can arise when products are  sufficiently differentiated while anti-competitive 
effects emerge with more homogeneous goods. 
A welfare analysis, taking into account not only the effects of anti-dumping measures but also 
the  impact  of anti-dumping  regulation  on  firms  incentives  to  collude  or  not,  revealed  that  the 
imposition of a duty  in the equilibrium market structure typically increases total domestic welfare.  In 
case of a duty,  the rent shifting from  foreign  producers more than  compensates domestic consumer 
losses.  The scope for such rent-shifting is normally larger with larger cost-asymmetries.  However in 
case of undertakings, the welfare effects tend to be negative.  A decrease in consumer surplus from the 
increase in price as well as the typical anti-competitive effect of anti-dumping outweigh the benefits to 
domestic producers.  Even in cases where undertakings have a pro-competitive effect, the welfare gain 
from  increased  competition  never  compensates  the  losses  from  the  protection  offered  through  an 
undertaking. 
With respect to the type of measure installed, our model clearly showed that decreasing the 
importance of consumer interests in the government welfare function  led to  an  increasing number of 
undertakings. Given that empirical studies have pointed out the EU's tendency towards undertakings 
rather than duties, our model can be used to explain this tendency as the result of mainly safeguarding 
domestic producers' interests. This confirms practitioners' well established intuitive beliefs. 
The [mdings reported in this paper suggest that use of antidumping measures can both have a 
pro- or an  anti-competitive effect, depending on government welfare,  cost asymmetries and product 
heterogeneity.  By showing this we encompassed previous findings  in  the antidumping literature that 
showed that antidumping either had a pro- (Reitzes 1993; Fischer, 1992) or an anti-competitive effect 
(Staiger &  Wolak 1992).  From a trade policy perspective, the results clearly ask for a cautious policy 
stance given the difficulty of assessing circumstances where one or the other effect applies. In general, 
pro-competitive effects tend to  occur with high product differentiation and limited cost asymmetries. 
But they  are  sensitive  to  filing  costs  and  only  occur when  consumers  interests  are  not  taken  into 
account.  And even more importantly, given that in case undertakings induce a pro-competitive effect, 
total EU welfare is  nevertheless reduced, other specific measure to promote an anti-trust objective are 
called  for.  The  most  important policy  conclusion  seems to  support the  idea put forward  by Gual 
(1995),  that multiplicity of objectives should be  avoided and that each policy should serve  its  own 
objectives with its own measures. 25 
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